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GLOSSARY 
 
Abbreviation Definition 
BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
G20 An international forum for the governments and 
central bank governors from 20 major economies. 
MNE Multinational Enterprise 
DTC Davis Tax Committee 
SARS South African Revenue Service 
CFC Controlled Foreign Company 
PE Permanent Establishment 
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SUMMARY 
 
Transfer pricing has become a very popular term in South Africa over the last few years, 
even more so since July 2013 when the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 
plan was issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and G20 (an international forum for the governments and central bank 
governors from 20 major economies). The OECD and G20 has issued the plan to 
address the perceived flaws in international tax rules, giving rise to profit shifting. 
Subsequently, the OECD has issued numerous reports and as a result has updated its 
2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Many countries have adopted these guidelines. 
However as South Africa is not an OECD member, there is no certainty that it will be 
adopted. 
 
The question is therefore: has the South African Tax legislation met the OECD 
guidelines and addressed the BEPS issue? Therefore, the objective of the research is to 
understand whether the current South African tax legislation is in line with the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and BEPS Action Plan. The South African tax legislation 
provides South African taxpayers with no guidance as to how the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines needs to be implemented and interpreted. However, even though not 
legislation, the SARS practice note 7 and draft interpretation note on thin capitalisation 
provides taxpayers with a good basis of understanding the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, as these documents provided by SARS is similar to that of the guidance in 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, specifically relating to transfer pricing 
documentation. 
The issue that may result where the South African tax legislation is not in line with the 
OECD guidelines and the BEPS Action Plan is that Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
may use South Africa as the country to shift its profits to or from, thus effectively 
resulting in a loss to the Fiscus. 
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KEY WORDS 
Arm’s length, transfer pricing documentation, intangibles (intellectual property), thin 
capitalisation, primary and secondary adjustments. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Research goals 
1.1 Introduction  
South Africa is one of the many non-members of the OECD.  However South Africa has 
a working relationship with the OECD. South Africa’s policy makers gain access to the 
expertise and good policy practices of the OECD, and the OECD in turn, benefits from 
the exposure1.  
“Cross-border transactions have become extremely popular over the last decade. The 
free movement of capital and labour, the shift of manufacturing bases from high-cost to 
low-cost locations, the gradual removal of trade barriers, technological and 
telecommunication developments, and the ever-increasing importance of managing 
risks and of developing, protecting and exploiting intellectual property, have had an 
important impact on the way cross-border activities take place”2.  
The OECD has published Transfer Pricing Guidelines and a BEPS Action Plan in order 
to address the issue of BEPS.  BEPS may be among the most important global 
economic debates of all time. Some businesses are worth millions but pay minimal to no 
taxes in the jurisdictions where they operate. This is simply because the tax systems are 
not up to scratch with taxing of profits made within the digital economy. Furthermore, 
businesses also avoid paying taxes through BEPS. This affects governments’ tax bases, 
and therefore governments increase the taxes to everyone else. Therefore, by 
implementing the BEPS Action plan it “will for example stop the abuse of transfer 
pricing by ensuring that taxable profits can’t be artificially shifted through the transfer 
of patents, copyright or other intangibles away from countries where the value is 
created, and it will oblige taxpayers to report their aggressive tax planning 
arrangements.” 3  
                                                     
1http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/south-africa-and-oecd.htm, Accessed: 21 July 2015. 
2Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf,  
Accessed: 21 July 2015. 
3http://oecdinsights.org/2013/07/19/what-is-beps-how-can-you-stop-it/, Accessed: 19 September 2015. 
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Wikipedia4 defines the term BEPS as follows: 
“Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is a technical term referring to the 
negative effect of multinational companies' tax avoidance strategies on national 
tax bases. BEPS can be achieved through the use of transfer pricing, or, more 
correctly, "transfer mispricing". BEPS is used in a project headed by the OECD 
which produced detailed reports in September 2014 in response to seven actions 
agreed previously. BEPS is said to be an "attempt by the world’s major 
economies to try to rewrite the rules on corporate taxation to address the 
widespread perception that the [corporations] don’t pay their fair share of 
taxes".” 
Furthermore, the BEPS Action Plan5, published by the OECD in July 2013, states that 
BEPS relates chiefly to instances where the interaction of different tax rules leads to 
double non-taxation or less than single taxation. It also relates to arrangements that 
achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away from the jurisdictions where the 
activities creating those profits take place. 
The BEPS Action Plan6 is a fifteen point action plan, with a timeline spanning a period 
of 2 years. A summary of the fifteen action points in terms of the BEPS Action Plan7 
are: 
1. Address the tax challenges of the digital economy. 
2. Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements. 
3. Strengthen controlled foreign company (CFC) rules. 
4. Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments. 
5. Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency 
and substance. 
6. Prevent treaty abuse. 
7. Prevent the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment (PE) status. 
                                                     
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_Erosion_and_Profit_Shifting,  Accessed: 25 July 2015. 
5Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf, 
Accessed: 21 July 2015. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
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8. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: Intangibles. 
9. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: Risks and 
Capital. 
10. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: Risk 
transactions. 
11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to 
address it. 
12. Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements. 
13. Re-examine transfer pricing documentation. 
14. Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective. 
15. Develop a multilateral instrument. 
The actions of specific reference to this research are points 8 (Assure that transfer 
pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: Intangibles), and 13 (Re-examine 
transfer pricing documentation).   
Many comments and discussion papers have been issued by the OECD and the public 
on the abovementioned actions. The Davis Tax Committee (DTC) has also issued 
comments on how the Plan should be incorporated into South African legislation. 
1.2 Research objectives and method 
The question is therefore: has the South African Tax legislation met the OECD 
guidelines and addressed the BEPS issue? The objective of the research is to understand 
whether the current South African tax legislation is in line with the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and BEPS Action Plan.  
The research also addresses the possible changes that may occur to the South African 
tax legislation in the near future as a result of the ongoing changes being made to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to address the issue of BEPS. 
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In addition the treatise examines the changes that have been made to the South African 
tax legislation as a result of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines with specific 
reference to section 31 of the Income Tax Act8  on and after 1 January 2015. 
The research study answers the following specific questions relating to the objective 
above: 
 Is the current income tax legislation in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines? (See Chapter 2, 3 and 4) 
 What changes have been made to the tax legislation, since the BEPS Action Plan 
was published on July 2013, in order to bring the tax legislation in line with the 
OECD view?  (See Chapter 3 and 5) 
 What are the issues that arise as a result of these changes?  (See Chapter 5) 
 What are the possible changes that can be made to the legislation to ensure that 
it is in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the BEPS Action 
Plan? (See Chapter 4) 
The approach of this treatise is as follows 
 This chapter – Introduction to the treatise, objectives and methodology. 
 Chapter 2 – Transfer Pricing: To explain transfer pricing with specific reference 
to the arm’s length principle and the transfer pricing methods that are acceptable 
to the South African Revenue Service (SARS). 
 Chapter 3 – Documentation: To give an overview of the OECD and DTC 
commentary regarding Action 13 and to determine whether the current tax 
legislation is in terms of the OECD guideline.  
 Chapter 4 – Value creation: Intangibles, risks and capital, and risk transactions: 
To give an overview of the OECD and DTC commentary regarding Action 8 
and to determine whether the current tax legislation is in terms of the updated 
OECD guideline.  
                                                     
8Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. 
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 Chapter 5 – Section 31: To give an overview of section 31 of the Act on and 
after 1 January 2015. 
 Chapter 6 – Risks of non-compliance: To give an overview of the possible risks 
of non-compliance. 
 Chapter 7 - Summary, conclusions and recommendations. 
In order to achieve the research objectives, books, online resources, tax journals and tax 
cases were scrutinized for relevant information.  The information extracted was 
analysed in accordance with its relevance in relation to this treatise.  Emphasis was 
placed on factual documents published and comments issued by the Davis Tax 
Committee and OECD in the form of reports and articles. 
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Chapter 2 Transfer pricing 
2.1 Introduction  
According to the Tax Justice Network9, transfer pricing happens whenever two 
companies that are part of the same multinational group trade with each other: when a 
US-based subsidiary of Coca-Cola, for example, buys something from a French-based 
subsidiary of Coca-Cola. When the parties establish a price for the transaction, this is 
transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is not, in itself, illegal or necessarily abusive. What is 
illegal or abusive is transfer mispricing, also known as transfer pricing manipulation or 
abusive transfer pricing. (Transfer mispricing is a form of a more general phenomenon 
known as trade mispricing, which includes trade between unrelated or apparently 
unrelated parties …) 
 
SARS set out their view of transfer pricing in Practice Note 7, dated 6 August 1999 
(PN7), namely that “the term transfer pricing describes the process by which entities set 
the prices at which they transfer goods or services between each other. The transfer 
prices adopted by a multinational have a direct bearing on the proportional profit it 
derives in each country in which it operates. If a non-market value (inadequate or 
excessive consideration) is paid for the transfer of goods or services between the 
members of a multinational, the income calculated for each of those members will be 
inconsistent with their relative economic contributions. This distortion will impact on 
the tax revenues of the relevant tax jurisdictions in which they operate.” For example, if 
a member of a Irish multinational sells to a connected person resident in South Africa at 
a price which exceeds the market price, the profit which the multinational earns in 
South Africa is reduced. Similarly if the member of a Irish multinational sells to a 
connected person resident in South Africa at a reduced price, the profit the multinational 
earns in South Africa is increased.  
                                                     
9http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/, Accessed: 12 September 2015. 
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Therefore, in summary the term transfer pricing is the price at which goods or services 
are charged between related parties across an international border.  
An example to illustrate transfer pricing and its effects on the different tax jurisdictions 
follows: 
Parts and spares used in the automotive industry are manufactured by a parent company 
in Ireland and sold to a subsidiary in South Africa for distribution to third parties. The 
Ireland company sells part X to the South African subsidiary at R90 per part, the cost of 
making a part is R35. The South African Subsidiary sells the part to third parties in 
South Africa at R100 per part. The corporate tax rate in Ireland is 12.5%10, and the tax 
rate in South Africa is 28%11. The profit and tax payable on this transaction in the 
different jurisdictions are: 
 Ireland South Africa 
Sale R90 R100 
Cost of sales R35 R90 
Profit R55 R10 
Tax payable  R6.84 R2.80 
 
The aim of the pricing is to ensure that the maximum profit is made in Ireland, thus 
resulting in most of the profits being taxed at the lower rate of 12.5% instead of the 28% 
rate in South Africa.  
As a result of the effects of transfer pricing, SARS adopted the internationally accepted 
arm’s length principle (see below) for taxation purposes as the basis for ensuring that 
the South African fiscus receives its fair share of tax. 
2.2 Arm’s length principle 
 
According to the Tax Justice Network12, if two unrelated companies trade with each 
other, a market price for the transaction will generally result. This is known as “arms-
                                                     
10http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/ct/, Accessed: 12 September 2015. 
11http://www.sars.gov.za/TaxTypes/CIT/Pages/default.aspx, Accessed: 12 September 2015. 
12http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/, Accessed: 12 September 2015. 
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length” trading, because it is the product of genuine negotiation in a market.  This arm’s 
length price is usually considered to be acceptable for tax purposes. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention13 deals with the arm’s 
length principle as follows: 
“[When] conditions are made or imposed between … two [associated] enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would have been 
made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.” 
PN7 states that “the problem to be resolved is how a multinational should determine 
what price would have arisen if transactions between its members were subject to 
market forces. The solution advanced by the arm’s length principle is that a comparable 
transaction between independent parties (an uncontrolled transaction) should be used as 
a benchmark against which to appraise the multinational’s prices (the controlled 
transaction). Any difference between the two transactions can then be identified and 
adjusted. An arm’s length price that will reflect the economic contributions made by the 
parties to the transaction can be determined for the controlled transaction.” 14 
Overall, an arm’s length price is the price charged of goods or services between third 
party persons. The issue that occurs in South Africa is that we have a lack of local 
comparables, there are no databases that provide for South Africa comparables. 
Taxpayers are placing great reliance on foreign databases to establish an arm’s length 
price, however, this can cause further issues to taxpayers as they are then required to 
make further adjustments to ensure that the transfer prices fairly reflect an arm’s length 
price. In terms of PN7, SARS will accept the use of foreign country comparables in 
taxpayers' transfer pricing analyses15. 
                                                     
13OECD 2014, Model Convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital, Accessed: 12 September 2015. 
14SARS, Practice Note 7, at 8. 
15SARS, Practice Note 7, at 25. 
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The Australian Taxation Office (Taxation Ruling 98/11, Chapter 5) has designed a four-
step approach as a useful tool for taxpayers to develop the methodology and 
documentation needed to support the evaluation of their transfer prices. The 
Commissioner of SARS endorses the four-step process as a useful tool. In annexure B 
of PN7, the Commissioner provides the four step approach, which is as follows: 
“Step 1: Understand the cross-border dealings between connected parties in the 
context of the business” i.e. A functional risk analysis report should be compiled; 
“Step 2: Select the pricing method or methods”; 
“Step 3: Application of the pricing method or methods”; 
Finally “Step 4: Arriving at the arm's length amount and introducing processes to 
support the chosen method”. 
A functional risk analysis is a report of all the functions performed by the tested party, 
locally and abroad. It also provides a general understanding of the business of the tested 
party. Furthermore, it sets out the risks that are borne by the tested party for e.g. market 
risks, foreign exchange risks etc. The functional risk analysis is the most important step 
of the solution as it will identify if there are any internal comparables that may be used 
as a transfer pricing method.  
The OECD issued a document to all its member states, Transfer Pricing – Suggested 
Approach, published in June 2011. With this document the OECD provides its member 
states with a suggested approach to its transfer pricing legislation. It further states that if 
a country implements transfer pricing legislation where it embodies the arm’s length 
principle, the country will be “protecting their tax base while not creating double 
taxation or uncertainties that could hamper foreign direct investment and cross-border 
trade.” 
South Africa is not an OECD member state, but it is submitted that there are many 
advantages to the country if it aligns its transfer pricing legislation with that of the 
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internationally accepted principles that are set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
guidelines. These advantages and benefits include but are not limited to16: 
 “Provide countries with the tools they need to fight artificial shifting of profits out of 
their jurisdiction by MNEs;  
 Provide MNEs with some certainty of treatment in the country concerned;  
 Reduce the risk of economic double taxation;  
 Provide a level playing field between countries, which is less likely to distort the 
pattern of international trade and investment; and  
 Provide a level playing field between MNEs and independent enterprises doing 
business within a country.”  
In summary, South Africa’s legislation does refer to the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines and the arm’s length principle. Even though PN7 refers to the old legislation 
and is not updated to reflect the changes that were made to the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines, it still provides the MNE’s with a guideline as to what the acceptable 
methods are that may be applied in determining an arm’s length price. 
2.3 Transfer pricing methods 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines17 issued in 2010 set out five methods to analyse 
the arm’s length nature of inter-company transactions. SARS is in agreement with these 
methods as they are stated in PN7. The methods are split between traditional transaction 
methods and transactional profit methods. The five methods that are approved by SARS 
are: 
Traditional transaction methods  
1 Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method) internal vs external (e.g. 
listed) 
                                                     
16OECD, 2011, Transfer Pricing – Suggested Approach, Introduction, Page 2, Accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/3.%20TP_Legislation_Suggested_Aproach.pdf, Accessed: 19 September 2015. 
17OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines, published on 21 July 2010. 
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“A transfer pricing method that compares the price for property or services transferred 
in a controlled transaction to the price charged for property or services transferred in a 
comparable uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances.” 18 
2 Resale price method (RP method) 
“A transfer pricing method based on the price at which a product that has been 
purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise. The 
resale price is reduced by the resale price margin. What is left after subtracting the 
resale price margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other costs associated with the 
purchase of the product (e.g. custom duties), as an arm’s length price of the original 
transfer of property between the associated enterprises.” 19 
3 Cost plus method (CP method) 
“A transfer pricing method using the costs incurred by the supplier of property (or 
services) in a controlled transaction. An appropriate cost plus mark-up is added to this 
cost, to make an appropriate profit in light of the functions performed (taking into 
account assets used and risks assumed) and the market conditions. What is arrived at 
after adding the cost plus mark up to the above costs may be regarded as an arm’s 
length price of the original controlled transaction. ” 20  
Transactional Profit Methods 
4 Profit Split Method  
“A transactional profit method that identifies the combined profit to be split for the 
associated enterprises from a controlled transaction and then splits those profits between 
the associated enterprises based upon an economically valid basis that approximates the 
                                                     
18Ibid, at 24. 
19Ibid, at 28. 
20Ibid, at 26. 
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division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement made 
at arm’s length. ” 21  
5 Transactional Net Margin Method 
“A transactional profit method that examines the net profit margin relative to an 
appropriate base (e.g. costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realises from a controlled 
transaction.”22 
The Commissioner for SARS endorses the abovementioned methods as acceptable 
transfer pricing methods, the most appropriate of these depending on the particular 
situation and the extent of reliable data to enable its proper application.23 The OECD 
provides for other methods if the standard methods do not provide an arm’s length 
result, however these methods are not approved by SARS.  
The method that will be used will be based on the facts and circumstances of the 
transaction. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that the most appropriate 
method is based on the following considerations:  
 “…the respective strengths and weaknesses of the OECD recognised methods;  
 The appropriateness of the method considered in view of the nature of the  
controlled transaction, determined in particular through a functional analysis; 
 The availability of reliable information (in particular on uncontrolled comparables) 
needed to apply the selected method and/or other methods; 
 The degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions, 
including the reliability of comparability adjustments that may be needed to 
eliminate material differences between them.”24 
                                                     
21Ibid, at 28. 
22Ibid, at 30. 
23Refer to paragraph 9.2.4 of the Practice Note. 
24OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, at 59, point 2.2. 
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Certain of the methods may provide a more reliable result than the others. Therefore, 
some may be preferred above the others. However, the most reliable method will be the 
one that requires the least amount of adjustments.  
Of the three traditional transaction methods (the CUP method, the RP method and the 
CP method), the CUP method is preferred, as it looks directly to the product or services 
transferred, and is relatively insensitive to the specific functions that are performed by 
the entities being compared. However, the RP method and CP method can be said to be 
ranked second as these methods examine gross margins, from which operating expenses 
are excluded. Therefore, the impact of relative cost structures should not be material for 
these two methods. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The question still remains, is the current income tax legislation in line with the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines? 
No, the South African tax legislation does not even refer to the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines and does not provide guidance on how to apply the arm’s length principle. 
Even though PN7 refers to old legislation and is not updated to reflect the changes that 
were made to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines, it still provides MNE’s with a 
guidance as to what the acceptable methods are that may be applied in determining an 
arm’s length price. 
Even though South Africa is not an OECD member, it does however understand that it 
will be to the countries benefit to adhere to the guidelines provided by the OECD. 
Therefore, the country should try and adopt as much as it possibly can of the OECD 
guidelines. 
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Chapter 3 Documentation 
3.1 Introduction  
In the BEPS action plan, the OECD and G20 realised that there is a need for 
transparency to the tax administration in regards to the documentation of transfer 
pricing. The BEPS action 13 which deals with the re-examination of transfer pricing 
documentation states: “Develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to 
enhance transparency for tax administration, taking into consideration the compliance 
costs for business. The rules to be developed will include a requirement that MNE’s 
provide all relevant governments with needed information on their global allocation of 
the income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries according to a common 
template.” 
Subsequent to the action plan that was issued in July 2013, the OECD has issued an 
interim report and a final report on action 13 in September 2014 and 5 October 2015, 
respectively.  In the final report, “Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by- 
Country Reporting”25 (TP report), the final report will replace the current chapter V of 
the OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines.  
The TP report prescribes a three-tiered standardised approach to transfer pricing 
documentation. This standard consists of: 
(i) “a master file containing standardised information relevant for all MNE group 
members; 
(ii) a local file referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer; 
and  
                                                     
25OECD, Action 13: Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting Final Report, published in 
2015, Chapter V at 14, Accessed at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/transfer-
pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_9789264241480-en#page13, 
Accessed: 6 October 2015. 
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(iii) a Country-by-Country Report containing certain information relating to the 
global allocation of the MNE group’s income and taxes paid together with 
certain indicators of the location of economic activity within the MNE group.”26 
3.2 Three-tiered standardised approach 
The TP report provides a detailed list of what is required to be included in the three 
reports. The aim of the reports are to provide standardisation so that transfer pricing 
compliance is more straightforward and more consistent among countries while at the 
same time providing tax administrations with more focused and useful information for 
transfer pricing risk assessments and audits. 
Master File 
The master file should provide an overview of the MNE group business, including the 
nature of its global business operations, its overall transfer pricing policies, and its 
global allocation of income and economic activity in order to assist tax administrations 
in evaluating the presence of significant transfer pricing risk. In general, the master file 
is intended to provide a high-level overview in order to place the MNE group’s transfer    
pricing practices in their global economic, legal, financial and tax context. It is not 
intended to require exhaustive listings of minutiae (e.g. a listing of every patent owned 
by members of the MNE group) as this would be both unnecessarily burdensome and 
inconsistent with the objectives of the master file. 27 
The information required in the master file provides a “blueprint” of the MNE group 
and contains relevant information that can be grouped in five categories:  
a) the MNE group’s organisational structure;  
b) a description of the MNE’s business or businesses;  
c) the MNE’s intangibles; 
d) the MNE’s intercompany financial activities; and  
                                                     
26Ibid, at 14. 
27Ibid, at 14. 
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(e) the MNE’s financial and tax positions. 
Taxpayers should present the information in the master file for the MNE as a whole. 28 
The master file must be filed to the local tax authorities and its purpose is to provide an 
overall perspective of the business. Therefore, taxpayers are not required to provide 
lengthy information regarding the description of its business. The file will assist 
taxpayers in understanding their processes for compiling their transfer pricing 
documentation. 
PN7 states that in order for a taxpayer to determine that its pricing is at arm’s length, 
one of the requirements is that the taxpayer needs to complete a functional risk analysis 
which should provide a quick overview of the organisation for those evaluating the 
transfer pricing policy of the multinational, to assist them in familiarising themselves 
with the general operations of the multinational. Secondly, the functional analysis 
should seek to identify the functions performed by each member of the multinational 
and assess the importance of each function to the overall operations of the multinational. 
Furthermore, one of the steps in determining transfer prices is “… understand the cross-
border dealings between connected parties in the context of the business …”29 (which in 
effect is the functional risk  analysis) and in this step the taxpayer is required to explain 
a) how the international connected-party dealings of the enterprise are undertaken; b) 
the purpose or object of the dealings; c) what the taxpayer obtains from its participation 
in the dealings (for example products, services or strategic relationships); and d) the 
significance of the dealings to the taxpayer's overall business activities and to those of 
the multinational.  
Therefore, even though practice notes do not form part of the South African legislation, 
the practice note does provide guidance which is similar to that required by the OECD.  
                                                     
28OECD, Action 13: Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting Final Report, published in 
2015, Chapter V at 15. Accessed at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/transfer-
pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_9789264241480-en#page13, 
Accessed: 6 October 2015. 
29SARS, Practice Note 7, at 39. 
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However, the transfer pricing document does not have to be filed with any tax 
authorities. The transfer pricing document should merely be kept readily available 
should the tax authorities request it. 
Local File 
The local file provides more detailed information relating to specific intercompany 
transactions. The information required in the local file supplements the master file and 
helps to meet the objective of assuring that the taxpayer has complied with the arm’s 
length principle in its material transfer pricing positions affecting a specific jurisdiction. 
The local file focuses on information relevant to the transfer pricing analysis related to 
transactions taking place between a local country affiliate and associated enterprises in 
different countries and which are material in the context of the local country’s tax 
system. Such information would include relevant financial information regarding those 
specific transactions, a comparability analysis, and the selection and application of the 
most appropriate transfer pricing method. Where a requirement of the local file can be 
fully satisfied by a specific cross-reference to information contained in the master file, 
such a cross-reference should suffice.30 
As the master file provides a high-level overview, in contrast, the local file provides 
more detailed information relating to specific material intercompany transactions. The 
information required in the local file should supplement the master file and assist in 
assessing whether the taxpayer has complied with the arm’s length principle in its 
material transfer pricing positions affecting a specific jurisdiction. 
In PN7’s four step approach to determine arm’s length pricing, the taxpayer needs to 
introduce processes to support the chosen method at arriving at the arm's length pricing.  
The taxpayer will be required to document and demonstrate how its data has been used 
                                                     
30OECD, Action 13: Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting Final Report, published in 
2015, Chapter V at 15. Accessed at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/transfer-
pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_9789264241480-en#page13, 
Accessed: 6 October 2015. 
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in the application of its chosen pricing method to determine an arm's length amount. 
Furthermore, the taxpayer will need to document the choice and resultant application of 
its transfer pricing methods for calculating an arm's length price. The document should 
have regard to a) the degree of comparability between the uncontrolled transactions 
used for comparison and the controlled transactions of the taxpayer; b) the completeness 
and accuracy of the data relied on; c) the reliability of all assumptions; and d) the 
sensitivity of any results to possible deficiencies in the data and assumptions. Therefore 
the requirements of the local file is very similar to that of a taxpayer’s normal transfer 
pricing documentation. 
PN7 does provide guidance which is similar to that required by the OECD.  However 
the transfer pricing document does not have to be filed with the any tax authorities. The 
transfer pricing document should merely be kept readily available should the tax 
authorities request it. 
Country-by-country report 
“The country-by-country report requires aggregate tax jurisdiction wide information 
relating to the global allocation of the income, the taxes paid, and certain indicators of 
the location of economic activity among tax jurisdictions in which the MNE group 
operates. The report also requires a listing of all the Constituent Entities for which 
financial information is reported, including the tax jurisdiction of incorporation, where 
different from the tax jurisdiction of residence, as well as the nature of the main 
business activities carried out by that Constituent Entity.  
The country-by-country report will be helpful for high-level transfer pricing risk 
assessment purposes. It may also be used by tax administrations in evaluating other 
BEPS related risks and where appropriate for economic and statistical analysis. 
However, the information in the country-by-country report should not be used as a 
substitute for a detailed transfer pricing analysis of individual transactions and prices 
based on a full functional analysis and a full comparability analysis. The information in 
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the country-by-country report on its own does not constitute conclusive evidence that 
transfer prices are or are not appropriate. It should not be used by tax administrations to 
propose transfer pricing adjustments based on a global formulary apportionment of 
income.31” 
The country-by-country reporting template is designed to provide tax authorities with 
specific information relating to the members of a multinational group (such as revenue, 
profit or loss before income tax, capital, number of employees, activities etc.). The 
information needs to be filed by the ultimate parent of the multinational group in its 
jurisdiction of residence, and the report needs to be updated every 12 months. The tax 
authorities in that jurisdiction will distribute the report directly to all the other tax 
authorities in the jurisdictions mentioned in the report. An exemption applies to 
multinational groups with an annual consolidated group revenue in the immediately 
preceding fiscal year of less than Euro 750 million. The filing will be required in respect 
of years of assessment commencing on or after 1 January 2016 and, therefore, the 
reports need to be filed on or after 31 December 2017. 
The issue that may arise as a result of the sharing of information across the tax 
authorities is the fact that the subsidiary in the other jurisdiction is unaware of the 
amounts and transactions that are included in the country-by-country report, unless the 
report is shared by the ultimate holding company that prepared it – the subsidiary may 
contradict the country-by-country report when it issues its local file to the local tax 
authorities. The contradiction may be as a result of incorrect disclosure made by either 
of the parties and different interpretation by the parties.  
Furthermore, MNE’s may be concerned about the confidentiality issues that may arise 
as a result of sharing of its information to the different tax authorities. In an article 
written by Kara Boatman, Doreen Liu and Ian Novos from KPMG LLP32, they state that 
“It is unclear just how information provided will be used and to whom it will be 
                                                     
31Ibid, at 16. 
32Kara Boatman, Doreen Liu and Ian Novos, Staying Ahead of the Curve: What Companies should consider in 
preparing the BEPS Master file, Bloomberg BNA,13 November 2014, Accessed: 6 October 2015. 
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provided. Even at this stage, governments have expressed concern about confidentiality 
and information exchange issues. Thus, companies may be somewhat cautious, at least 
initially, about revealing information unnecessarily. A trade-off probably will need to be 
evaluated between turning over more information at the risk of having it revealed more 
widely—even potentially publicly—and having some tax authorities cherry-pick that 
information to make a transfer pricing adjustment; and revealing less information and 
possibly facing aggressive audits because the company is suspected of concealing 
relevant information.”  
Therefore, due to confidentiality issues MNE’s will find it difficult to provide the tax 
authorities with full disclosure on these reports. However, the country-by-country report 
should not be used as a substitute for a detailed transfer pricing analysis of individual 
transactions and prices based on a full functional analysis and comparability analysis. 
Where the country-by-country report is provided to other tax authorities in other 
jurisdictions, the country-by-country report can only be used as a high level risk 
assessment and therefore cannot be used as a basis to audit an entity. The other tax 
authorities are also not allowed to make any transfer pricing adjustments based on the 
report33.  
The annexures in the TP report provide examples of the information that should be 
contained in these three documents.  
“Taken together, these three documents (master file, local file and country-by-country 
report) will: 
 require taxpayers to articulate consistent transfer pricing positions, 
 provide tax administrations with useful information to assess transfer pricing risks, 
 make determinations about where audit resources can most effectively be deployed, 
and 
                                                     
33OECD, Action 13: Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting Final Report, published in 
2015, Chapter V at 16. Accessed at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/transfer-
pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_9789264241480-en#page13, 
Accessed: 6 October 2015. 
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 in the event audit are asked for, provide information to commence and target audit 
enquiries.”34 
In terms of the TP report, the advantages of transfer pricing documentation is threefold: 
1. “To ensure that taxpayers give appropriate consideration to transfer pricing 
requirements in establishing prices and other conditions for transactions between 
associated enterprises and in reporting the income derived from such transactions in 
their tax returns; 
2. To provide tax administrations with the information necessary to conduct an 
informed transfer pricing risk assessment; and 
3. To provide tax administrations with useful information to employ in conducting an 
appropriately thorough audit of the transfer pricing practices of entities subject to tax in 
their jurisdiction, although it may be necessary to supplement the documentation with 
additional information as the audit progresses.” 35  
3.3 The South African position 
The aim of the research is to determine whether the South African Tax legislation is in 
line with the terms of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. 
In terms of the South African tax legislation it is not mandatory to prepare transfer 
pricing documentation. Although there is clearly no statutory or other requirement to 
prepare and maintain transfer pricing documentation, it is in the taxpayer’s best interests 
to document how transfer prices have been arrived at since this is the best method to 
demonstrate that transfer prices are consistent with the arm’s length principle. 
Taxpayers electing not to prepare transfer pricing documentation are exposed on two 
accounts. Firstly, it is more likely that the Commissioner will examine a taxpayer’s 
                                                     
34DTC, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in South Africa, Davis Tax Committee Interim Report, Action 
13: Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation, published in 2014. Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
action-13-guidance-implementation-tp-documentation-cbc-reporting.pdf, Accessed: 14 September 2015. 
35OECD, Action 13: Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting Final Report, published in 
2015, Chapter V at 12, Accessed at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/transfer-
pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_9789264241480-en#page13, 
Accessed: 6 October 2015. 
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transfer pricing in greater detail if proper documentation has not been prepared. 
Secondly, if the Commissioner substitutes an alternative arm’s length amount to that 
adopted by the taxpayer, the lack of adequate documentation will make it difficult for 
the taxpayer to rebut that substitution.  
The burden of proof regarding transfer pricing adjustments have changed numerous 
times over the years. Currently, section 31 of the Act requires that where a foreign 
connected transaction has occurred and it has not occurred at an arm’s length basis, an 
adjustment is required. So in effect, should the taxpayer know that its foreign connected 
transactions are not at arm’s length the taxpayer has the responsibility to adjust its 
taxable income accordingly to thus ensure that the transaction is at arm’s length. 
PN7 deals with the “Determination of the taxable income of certain persons from 
international transactions: transfer pricing” and in respect of transfer pricing 
documentation it states that as a general rule the Commissioner considers that taxpayers 
should contemporaneously document the process they have followed and their analysis 
in determining transfer prices, in their efforts to comply with the arm’s length principle. 
The Commissioner will rely as much as possible on documentation that should be 
created in the ordinary course of business and of setting a transfer price. This 
documentation (according to PN 7) will generally address the following: 
 Identification of transactions in terms of international agreements entered into with 
connected persons and the extent of any other commercial or financial relations with 
connected persons which fall within the scope of Section 31; 
 Copies of the international agreements entered into with connected persons; 
 A description of the nature and terms (including prices) of all the relevant 
transactions (including a series of transactions and any relevant off-setting 
transactions); 
 The method that has been used to arrive at the nature and terms of the relevant 
transactions (including the functional analysis undertaken and an appraisal of 
potential comparables); 
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 The reasons why the choice of method was considered to be the most appropriate to 
the relevant transactions and to the particular circumstances; 
 An explanation of the process used to select and apply the method used to establish 
the transfer prices and why it is considered to provide a result that is consistent with 
the arm's length principle; 
 Information relied on in arriving at the arm’s length terms such as commercial 
agreements with third parties, financial information, budgets, forecasts etc. 
 Details of any special circumstances that have influenced the price set by the 
taxpayer. 
This should include some justification of why those transfer prices are considered to be 
consistent with the arm's length principle.  
Again, although not law, PN7 does provide taxpayers with guidance and indicates 
SARS approach to the issue. However, since it was issued in 1999 it refers to the old 
OECD transfer pricing guidelines that were updated in 1995 and old South African tax 
legislation. Taxpayers may use the practice note to provide some guidance, but need to 
bear in mind that it is outdated. 
3.4 Draft interpretation note 
As a result of the changes made to section 31 of the Act, and specifically the 
introduction of the definition of an “affected transaction”, the amended section applies 
to all years of assessment commencing on or after 1 April 2012. SARS issued a draft 
interpretation note36 on thin capitalisation (thin capitalisation is discussed in more detail 
in chapter 5). The draft interpretation note states the following on documentation: 
“The documentation a taxpayer will need to support its arm’s length amount of debt 
and, if applicable, thin capitalisation adjustment, will vary depending upon the facts and 
                                                     
36SARS, Draft interpretation note: Section 31 Determination of the taxable income of certain persons from 
international transactions: Thin Capitalisation, at12, Accessed at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Drafts/LAPD-LPrep-Draft-2013-10%20-
20Draft%20IN%20Determination%20Taxable%20Income%20International%20Transactions%20Thin%20Capitalisat
ion.pdf, Accessed: 6 September 2015. 
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circumstances of the particular case including its’ size and complexity. However, as a 
guideline SARS considers that, as appropriate to the particular facts and circumstances, 
taxpayers should retain the following documentation on their capitalisation position:  
 A description of the funding structure which has been or is in the process of being 
put in place, including the dates of transactions, a clear statement of the source of the 
funds (immediate and ultimate), reasons for obtaining the funds, how the funds were 
or will be applied (the purpose of the funding) and the repayment terms.  
 A description of the business (including the type of business, details of the specific 
business, details regarding the management team and external market conditions) 
and the plans of the principal trading operations (including the business strategy). 
 Copies of relevant funding agreements and other relevant documents, for example, 
board minutes relevant to the funding, South African Reserve Bank applications and 
approvals, copies of related funding applications (for example, where part of the 
funding is received from an offshore bank).  
 An analysis of the financial strategy of the business, including how capital is 
allocated and the relationship between capital and cash flows from operations and 
any changes relating to the funding transactions; and details regarding principal cash 
flows and the sources of repayment of debt.  
 A group structure covering all relevant companies and clearly setting out any 
changes to the structure taking place over the course of the funding transactions.  
 Copies of the financial statements or management accounts just before the point in 
time the funding is obtained and after the funding transactions.  
 An analysis supporting the borrower’s view of the extent to which the connected 
party (or supported) debt is considered to be arm’s length.” 37 
The information required per the draft interpretation note has certain elements of the 
master file (as defined above) in the sense that the interpretation note requires the 
taxpayer to disclose a description of its business and its group structure. However, the 
interpretation note is quite focused on the funding and debt of a taxpayer. It does not 
                                                     
37SARS, Draft interpretation note on thin capitalisation, at 12. 
  
 
28 
 
refer to any other foreign intercompany transactions as required in the local file. There 
is also no reference to the disclosure of the revenue, profit or loss before income tax, 
capital, and number of employees of the members within the multinational group. 
Most of the information required to be disclosed per the draft interpretation note is also 
required in terms of PN7. Therefore should the draft interpretation note be issued as 
final, the taxpayer will not be required to gather a lot of additional information. 
Even though South Africa is not an OECD member state, they are a member of the G20, 
which had tasked the OECD to propose measures to tackle perceived BEPS, and 
therefore it is widely expected that South Africa will follow the recommendations by 
the OECD. 
3.5 Tax Administration Act 
The Tax Administration Act38 (TAA) implemented with effect from 1 October 2012, 
governs the administration of the different tax Acts, including the Income Tax Act. The 
Act governs, inter alia, disputes, appeals, assessments, interest, penalties, 
documentation and record keeping. Section 40 of the TAA states that SARS may select 
a person for inspection, verification or audit on the basis of any consideration relevant 
for the proper administration of a tax Act, including on a random or a risk assessment 
basis. Section 46 further states that SARS may, for the purposes of the administration of 
a tax Act require the taxpayer or another person to, within a reasonable period, submit 
relevant material (whether orally or in writing) that SARS requires. A request by SARS 
for relevant material from a person other than the taxpayer is limited to relevant 
information related to the records maintained or that should reasonably be maintained 
by the person in relation to the taxpayer. 
                                                     
38Tax Administration Act, No 28 of 2011. 
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Therefore, the TAA provides SARS with the right to request transfer pricing 
documentation, including from a third party, should it be reasonable to expect that third 
party to maintain that information.  
In terms of section 31 of the Act, the onus is on the taxpayer to prove to the 
Commissioner that its transactions are at arm’s length.  The Act merely states that the 
adjustment to taxable income must be made where the transaction is not at arm’s length, 
hence if the Commissioner is of the view that it is not at arm’s length it is the taxpayer’s 
onus to prove otherwise. Therefore, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove the 
Commissioner wrong. If a taxpayer has not maintained appropriate records, the process 
of checking compliance with the arm’s length principle becomes far more difficult and 
the Commissioner’s officials are forced to rely on less documentary evidence in 
applying a transfer pricing method, thus requiring a greater degree of judgment by the 
SARS officials. 
3.6 Tax Return 
Even though the South African tax legislation does not provide for any specific transfer 
pricing documentation to be retained by the taxpayer, the South African corporate tax 
return (ITR14) requires a taxpayer to supply certain specific information regarding 
cross-border transactions entered into between connected persons. It further requires the 
taxpayer to indicate whether or not transfer pricing documentation in respect of the 
relevant year of assessment is in place. A small business (where the gross income 
(sales/turnover plus other income) does not exceed R14 million and total assets (current 
and non-current) does not exceed R10 million) is not required to complete the new 
questions. With effect from 4 May 2013, the ITR1439 was amended to include the 
following: 
Some of the new questions included are: 
                                                     
39An extract of a Medium to Large business ITR14 on E-filing, Annexure D of the Comprehensive guide to the 
ITR14 for companies issued by SARS. 
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 “Did the company receive or earn any foreign income or incur any foreign 
expenditure or pay any royalties, interest, dividends or consulting fees to a non- 
resident? 
 “For years of assessments on or after 1 April 2012, did the company enter into an 
“affected transaction” as defined in s31(1)(a), where the company: Received/earned 
foreign income? 
 “For years of assessments on or after 1 April 2012, did the company enter into an 
“affected transaction” as defined in s31(1)(a), where the company: Incurred foreign 
expenditure?” 
 
If any of the above answers are yes, then the following supporting questions will 
need to be answered: 
 “Does the company have transfer pricing documentation that supports the pricing 
policy applied to each transaction between the company and the foreign connected 
person during the year of assessment as being at arm’s length? 
 “Did the company conduct any outbound transaction, operation, scheme, agreement 
for no consideration with a connected person that is tax resident outside South 
Africa? 
 “Did the company transact with a connected person that is tax resident in a tax 
haven/low tax jurisdiction? 
 “Did the company make a year-end adjustment to achieve a guaranteed profit 
margin?”  
The new disclosure requirements also require companies to breakdown the following 
items into local, foreign connected and foreign non-connected, if certain questions listed 
above are answered yes: 
 Received/Receivable and Paid/Payable 
 Sale of goods/ Purchases of goods 
 Commission 
 Interest 
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 Royalties or licence fees 
 Administration , management, secretarial fees, rentals 
 Guarantee fees 
 Insurance premiums 
 Other finance charges 
 Research and development fees 
 Other income/other expenses 
It also requires companies to calculate and disclose its debt-to-earnings before interest, 
tax depreciation and amortisation, interest cover (EBITDA) and debt-to-equity ratios. 
Although the safe harbour rule for thin capitalisation (see chapter 5) has been removed 
from the South African tax legislation, SARS is still of the view that a greater thin 
capitalisation risk exists if the debt to EBITDA ratio of a South African taxpayer 
exceeds three to one. Therefore, the relevance of the ratios would be to provide SARS 
with a risk assessment of the debt. 
The ITR14 provides a summary of a taxpayer’s foreign connected person transactions. 
It provides SARS with a very high level risk assessment. It cannot be used as a full 
functional risk analysis. However, should the taxpayer answer the question regarding 
whether its transactions are at “arm’s length”, the taxpayer is required to have the 
necessary documentation in place to support it. 
3.7 Davis Tax Committee’s view 
The Davis Tax Committee (DTC) set up in July 2013 with the objective to assess South 
Africa’s tax policy framework and its role in supporting the objectives of inclusive 
growth, employment, development and fiscal sustainability, reviewed the OECD report 
‘Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting 
Guidance’ issued in September 2014, and issued a report named “Addressing Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting in South Africa, Davis Tax Committee Interim Report, 
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Action 13: Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation” and as a result has issued the 
following recommendations40 to South Africa: 
 Practice Note 7 must be revised and updated to be in line with the OECD revised TP 
Documentation Guidelines and the finalisation of the draft Interpretation Note must 
be prioritised.  
 The OECD's recommendation that countries should adopt a standardised approach to 
transfer pricing documentation that follows a three-tiered structure consisting of a 
master file, a local file and country-by-country reporting should also be adopted in 
South Africa. 
 The three-tiered structure should however, only be compulsory for large 
multinational businesses with a group turnover of over 1 billion rand, instead of the 
Euro 750 million exemption provided by the OECD. 
 SARS should balance requests for transfer pricing documentation against the 
expected cost and administrative burden to the taxpayer of creating it. 
 The country-by-country report for South Africa should contain additional 
transactional data regarding related party interest payments, royalty payments and 
especially related party service fees so that SARS may perform risk assessments 
where it is difficult to obtain information on the operations of a multinational group. 
 In respect of the timing for each of the three reports, SARS should set out what its 
expectations are, as the OECD recommends that the local file should be finalised no 
later than the due date for the filing of the tax return; the master file should be 
updated by the tax return due date for the ultimate parent of the group; and the 
country-by-country report, should be submitted when the final statutory financial 
statements are finalised. 
 The master file, the local file and the country-by-country report should be reviewed 
and updated annually and database searches for comparables should be updated 
every three years. 
                                                     
40Davis Tax Committee, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in South Africa, Davis Tax Committee Interim 
Report, Action 13: Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation, published in 2014, at 15, Accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-13-guidance-implementation-tp-documentation-cbc-reporting.pdf, Accessed: 14 
September 2015. 
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 SARS should start to build a database of comparable information as the OECD 
recommends that the most reliable information is usually local comparables. 
 SARS needs to establish a highly skilled transfer pricing team to include not only 
lawyers and accountants but also business analysts and economists, to ensure an 
understanding of commercial operations. This will require that measures are taken to 
identify, employ and retain skilled personnel especially in the regions. 
 Information required from corporates via the ITR14 submissions needs to be 
improved so that timely decisions can be made on the tax assessment of companies. 
 The collection and sharing of data should be extended to include other holders of 
vital information such as exchange control information about capital outflows 
collected by the South African Reserve Bank. 
Based on the comments made by the DTC, the implementation of the three-tiered 
documentation structure is welcomed, but the DTC is of the view that SARS needs to 
consider certain setbacks should the reports be required to be submitted annually. SARS 
should ensure that they have the necessary resources, skills and expertise to ensure that 
the risk assessment is done timeously. 
In conclusion, the South African tax legislation does not require any form of 
documentation to be prepared and/or submitted to the Commissioner. However, in terms 
of section 31 of the Act, the taxpayer is required to provide support to its foreign 
connected person pricing and the burden of proof that pricing is at arm’s length is 
effectively on the taxpayer.  
3.8 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the South African transfer pricing legislation is expected to reflect 
the OECD transfer pricing guidelines within the next year. Even though it’s not 
mandatory in terms of the current legislation, the Commissioner may call on 
documentation to support the taxpayers’ pricing in terms of the TAA. If the taxpayer 
fails to provide the Commissioner with the relevant material requested in terms of 
section 46 of the TAA and section 31 of the Act, the taxpayer may be held non-
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compliant and may be subjected to penalties and transfer pricing adjustments in terms of 
section 31 of the Act. 
Therefore, the South African legislation should be updated to reflect that required by the 
OECD in terms of transfer pricing documentation.  However it is submitted that there 
are additional considerations to be taken into account: 
 SARS should update or delete PN 7, as it is outdated. 
 SARS should update and issue the interpretation to reflect the new legislation and 
the changes to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. 
 SARS needs to consider, as noted in the DTC report, whether they have the 
necessary skills, information and resources to be able to ensure that they are 
interpreting the reports correctly.  
 SARS needs to consider that South Africa lacks sufficient and/or suitable local 
comparable data. As a result of the lack of local comparable data, foreign 
comparable data needs to be appropriately adjusted for.  
 In certain instances where SARS audits taxpayers SARS requests taxpayers to 
complete a transfer pricing questionnaire. The questionnaire provides SARS with a 
further risk assessment. SARS needs to assess whether the questionnaire is in line 
with the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. 
 Involve the South African Reserve Bank, where the bank does not allow the flow of 
cash across the borders where no transfer pricing documentation is in place. The 
South African Reserve Bank should request transfer pricing documentation where 
payments are made to entities within low tax jurisdictions, the South African 
Reserve Bank can even request transfer pricing documentation where payments flow 
across the borders that exceed a certain amount. 
As the DTC has recommended that the OECD BEPS related proposals should be 
adopted, South African members of multinational groups should start preparing for the 
new reporting requirements to come. In order to start preparing for the new 
requirements the MNE’s may do the following: 
  
 
35 
 
 The taxpayer needs to understand the reports and understand what type of 
information is required. 
 The availability and format of data needs to be assessed, as the taxpayer may need to 
adjust its systems to ensure that the data is easily accessible. 
 The taxpayer should attempt a “dry-run” to determine if there are any other issues 
when preparing the reports. The issues may be resolved prior to the preparation of 
the actual reports. 
 Reporting responsibilities should be assigned to personnel, thus ensuring that 
personnel can take ownership of the reports. 
 Reporting deadlines should be assessed and planned timeously as it is more than 
likely that transfer pricing documentation will be required to be submitted alongside 
the tax return and will therefore become part of the annual tax compliance cycle. 
With effect from the date that the BEPS Action Plan was published in July 2013 there 
have been no changes to the South African tax legislation in respect of transfer pricing 
documentation to align the tax legislation to that issued by the OECD in its BEPS 
reports. 
The guidance in PN7 provides a lot of similarity to that of the local file and master file 
that is required by the OECD, therefore significant changes to the tax legislation are not 
expected in this regard.  However the South African legislation does not have any 
requirements for country-by-country reporting. As a result of the fact that it has been 
welcomed by the DTC, SARS may very likely bring the requirement of the country-by-
country reporting into the tax legislation. Should these requirements be legislated, 
SARS should ensure that their systems are upgraded and are able to handle the storage 
of the reports. Furthermore, SARS should ensure that it has the resources and skills 
required to interpret the reports, specifically the country-by-country report.  
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Chapter 4 Value creation: Intangibles 
4.1 Introduction 
The BEPS Action Plan was implemented to direct the OECD to address a number of 
transfer pricing issues, of specific reference to intangibles, it states as follows: 
“Develop rules to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among group members. This 
will involve (i) adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles; (ii) 
ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately 
allocated in accordance with (rather than divorced from) value creation; (iii) developing 
transfer pricing rules or special measures for transfers of hard to value intangibles; and 
(iv) updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements.” 41 
The OECD has in the past done extensive work on the transfer pricing of intangibles 
which are in line with Action Plan 8. In Action Plan 8, the OECD recommends that 
countries develop rules to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among MNE group 
companies. The OECD issued its final report on Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes 
with Value Creation on the 5 October 2015, the report deals with Actions 8, 9 and 10 
and it replaces and adds to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The aim of the BEPS report on intangibles, inter alia, is to provide guidance to countries 
by providing countries with transfer pricing rules for transfers of hard-to-value 
intangibles, allocation of intangible returns and emphasis of the importance of substance 
and functions performed in allocating intangible related returns. The guidance states that 
legal ownership and contractual arrangements are the key starting point for the transfer 
pricing analysis of intangibles. 
                                                     
41OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, at 20. 
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4.2 OECD Revision to chapter VI of Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
The revision to chapter VI of Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that it provides 
guidance and addresses the opportunities for BEPS resulting from the transfer of 
intangibles amongst members of an MNE group.  As a result of this guidance, members 
of the MNE group are to be compensated based on the value they create through 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed in the development, enhancement, 
maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles. In analysing the risks assumed 
depends on a very specific and meaningful control requirement, which takes into 
account both the capability to perform relevant decision-making functions together with 
the actual performance of such functions.  
If a company contractually assuming a specific risk does not exercise control over that 
risk nor has the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the guidance in the revised 
chapter determines that the risk will be allocated to another member of the MNE group 
that does exercise such control and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. The 
control requirement is used in this chapter to determine which parties assume risks in 
relation to intangibles, but also for assessing which member of the MNE group in fact 
controls the performance of outsourced functions in relation to the development, 
enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. 
In the nutshell report called “The October 2015 BEPS Deliverables” 42 prepared by 
KPMG, the OECD deliverables issued thus far were looked at, and as a result, key 
guidance points were summarised. In summary the report states that the legal ownership 
of an intangible does not in itself provide a right to all (or even any) of the return 
generated from its exploitation. Instead those returns accrue to the entities which carry 
out the functions of development, enhancement, management, protection and 
exploitation in relation to that intangible. The new guidelines emphasises: 
                                                     
42KPMG LLP, The October 2015 BEPS Deliverables, 2015, at 2, Accessed: 10 October 2015. 
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 the need to accurately delineate a transaction so that the conduct of parties will 
replace contractual arrangements where they are incomplete or out of line with the 
conduct. Transactions can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes where they 
lack commercial rationality. 
 Return for risk is allocated to the party which controls it and has the financial 
capacity to assume it. An entity only providing capital will be entitled to no more 
than a risk free return. 
 Enhanced rules on how to apply the CUP (comparable uncontrolled price) 
methodology to commodity transactions. 
 A safe harbour for low value adding services recommended, with a light touch 
benefits test and prescribed net cost plus margins of between 2% and 5%. 
 Changes to the rules on Cost Contribution Arrangements to align them with the 
other TP outcomes. 
These guidelines cement the importance of underlying substance and value creation 
over legal ownership/funding. 
4.3 Intangibles and its South African risk 
The South African tax legislation does not define the term intangible, but it broadly 
defines the term ‘intellectual property’ in section 23I of the Act. In terms of the Act, 
Intellectual property means any patent or application for a patent as defined in the 
Patents Act, a design as defined in the Designs Act, a trade mark as defined in the Trade 
Marks Act, a copyright as defined in the Copyright Act, any of the above defined or 
described in any similar law in a country other than the Republic, property or similar 
right to those defined above and any knowledge connected with the use of any of the 
above. 
 
The transfer pricing issue that arises as a result of intangibles amongst MNE group 
companies are that the MNE group will recognise the intangible asset in the company 
that is in the lowest tax jurisdiction. For example, a MNE group which consist of three 
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companies, the holding company and its two wholly owned subsidiaries. The holding 
company is incorporated in Germany, the one subsidiary in Australia and the other in 
South Africa. For the South African company it would be to its advantage to have the 
holding company recognise the intellectual property such as brands, trademarks, 
licences etc. The South African company would in exchange for use of the intellectual 
property pay the German company a fee, also known as a royalty. The South African 
company would generally claim a deduction for the royalty payments, subject to certain 
limitations. However, the South African company will be subject to withholding tax at a 
rate of 15% in terms of section 49B of the Act, where the royalties are seen as a source 
within the Republic in terms of section 9(2) of the Act. 
However, the withholding tax is reduced to zero in terms of article 9 of the double tax 
treaty between South Africa and Germany43. 
Had the Australian subsidiary company held the intangible, the double tax treaty 
between South Africa and Australia merely reduces the withholding tax on royalties to 
10%. However, in both cases the South African entity may still get the deduction of the 
royalty payment. And with little to no taxes being paid to either of the other two 
jurisdictions.  
With the new chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing guidelines, there are a few factors that 
need to be taken into account to determine which company in an MNE group actually 
owns the intangible. One should assess which company contractually assumes the risk 
relating to the intangible. The company should also have the capacity to exercise control 
over that risk and have the financial capacity to assume the risk. Based on the example 
above, should the German holding company contractually own the intangible, but does 
not actually control the rights relating to the intangible and it does not have the financial 
capacity to assume the risks associated to the intangible then the guidance in the revised 
                                                     
43Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the federal Republic of Germany for the avoidance of double 
taxation with respect to taxes on income, at 8, Accessed: 6 September 2015. 
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chapter determines that the risk will be allocated to another member of the MNE group 
that does exercise such control and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. 
4.4 Section 23I of the Act 
Section 23I of the Act is an anti-avoidance section which in broad terms seeks to 
disallow as a deduction any expenditure incurred for the use of certain intellectual 
property, where the intellectual property was previously owned by a South African 
entity and transferred to a non-South African entity or was developed in South Africa. 
Silke44 deals with section 23I of the Act and states that the principle underlying 
section 23I is that, where intellectual property was previously owned by a taxable 
person45 (in other words, a person falling within the South African tax net), no tax 
arbitrage should result from the payment of royalties by that taxable person to a non-
taxable person. (This discussion excludes any payments to Controlled Foreign 
Companies.) 
The opportunity for arbitrage arises where expenditure incurred in the development of 
intellectual property is often fully deductible. The payer of royalties is usually entitled 
to a deduction for those royalty payments, and the receipt or accrual of royalties forms 
part of gross income if the payer or recipient is a taxable entity falling within the South 
African tax net. 
The concern of SARS was that the scheme of the Act lacked effective mechanisms to 
prevent tax arbitrage where a taxpayer assigned South African intellectual property to 
an entity with a lower effective tax rate, and then licensed the same intellectual property 
to fully taxable South African taxpayers. From that juncture, the licensee would make 
deductible payments to the holder of the intellectual property rights who operated 
wholly or partly outside the South African tax net. In many instances, the royalty 
payments are simply returned to the licensee (payer) in the form of dividends, whilst the 
                                                     
44Silke, Silke on South African Tax, Lexis Nexis, 2015, chapter 7.48. 
45In essence a taxable person defined in section 23I of the Act is a person who was or is a South African resident. 
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tax deductions for payments made by the licensee might be so large as to reduce the 
latter’s taxable income to little or nothing. These considerations led to the enactment of 
section 23I of the Act. 
Section 23I targets ‘tainted intellectual property’ and seeks to deny a deduction of 
expenditure incurred where the taxpayer is contractually obligated to pay the expense, if 
it is determined with reference to expenditure for the use or right of use of the tainted 
intellectual property.  
The definition of ‘tainted intellectual property’ in s 23I(1) has two aspects. First, the 
property in question must qualify as ‘intellectual property’, a term widely defined. 
Secondly, the intellectual property must be ‘tainted intellectual property’, which is 
defined as meaning, intellectual property which falls into one of the following 
categories, namely intellectual property: 
‐ “[W]hich was the property of the end user or of a taxable person that is or was a 
connected person…” (defined in section 31(4) of the Act) to the end user. A 
connected person in relation to another company is where the one company 
holds 20% or more of the shares or voting rights, even if the majority voting 
rights are held by another shareholder. 
‐ “[W]hich is now the property of a taxable person”. 
‐ In respect of which “a material part … was used by a taxable person in carrying 
on a business while that property was the property of a taxable person and the 
end user of that intellectual property acquired that business or a material part 
thereof as a going concern”. 
‐ “[W}hich was discovered, devised, developed, created or produced by the end 
user of that [intellectual] property, or by a taxable person that is a connected 
person … in relation to the end user,…” where that end user “… together with a 
taxable person … holds at least 20% of the participation rights …”. 
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However, an override comes into play where the royalty payment is subject to 
withholding tax (after the application of a double tax agreement). In such a case, part of 
the royalty may be claimed as a tax deduction if the royalty is subject to the withholding 
tax on royalties. Where the company is subject to withholding tax of 15% in terms of 
subsections 49A to 49G, the licensee will be permitted to deduct an amount equal to 
50% of the royalty expenses. Where a double tax agreement reduces the royalty 
withholding tax rate in respect of royalties to 10%, the taxpayer will be entitled to the 
one-third deduction as long as the rate is not reduced below 10% in terms of the specific 
treaty. 
For example46, where a South African company sells intellectual property that it owns, 
to a non-resident company in Germany. The German company licenses the intellectual 
property to the South African company for an arm’s length royalty. The South African 
company was the original creator of the intellectual property and is now the end user 
therefore the royalty payment by the South African company is not deductible. 
However, should the German company be replaced with an Australian company, bear in 
mind the facts remain the same. Section 23I of the Act is still applicable as the South 
African company is the creator and end user of the intellectual property. However, the 
double tax agreement between South Africa and Australia reduces the withholding tax 
rate to 10%, therefore the South African company would be eligible to a deduction of 
one-third of the royalty payments. Section 23I of the Act, provides the South African 
fiscus with a good basis to prevent value shifting out of South Africa to low or no tax 
jurisdictions.  
                                                     
46Phillip Haupt, An example adapted from Notes on South African Income Tax, Huxham and Haupt, 2015. 
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4.5 The DTC’s comments on intangibles in South Africa 
The DTC reiterates that transfer pricing is a key focus area for SARS and that the South 
African Reserve Bank has been approached to assist in determining the magnitude of 
BEPS relating to transfer pricing47.  
The BEPS concern in relation to South African owned intellectual property is the 
possibility that MNEs may transfer valuable intellectual property to low tax or tax free 
jurisdictions to ensure a flow of royalty income to that jurisdiction. In assessing this 
concern, the DTC, amongst others, considered the South African exchange control rules 
which prohibits the export of South African developed intellectual property and requires 
South African based owners of intellectual property, which make the intellectual 
property available to foreign related parties, to charge an appropriate royalty for the 
intellectual property. 
The DTC came to the conclusion that Action Plan 8 may not require major legislative 
attention in South Africa at this stage. The DTC is of the opinion that the exchange 
control restrictions, the punitive tax consequences in terms of section 23I of the Act for 
the payments of royalties by South African taxpayers which previously used to own the 
relevant intellectual property, amongst others, readily prevent transfer pricing of 
intangibles in South Africa48. 
The DTC further cautions that care should be taken in developing tax legislation on 
transferring of intangibles that is too restrictive and that limits the development of 
intellectual property in South Africa. This will reduce the investments in South Africa in 
relation to intangibles 49. 
                                                     
47Davis Tax Committee, Action 8: Assure Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in line with value creation with regards to 
intangibles, At 16, Accessed: 6 September 2015. 
48Ibid, at 21. 
49Ibid, at 22. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The new chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing guidelines developed rules to prevent BEPS 
by moving intangibles among group members. In order to achieve this, the new chapter 
adopted a broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles; ensuring that profits 
associated with the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in 
accordance with  value creation; developing transfer pricing rules or special measures 
for transfers of hard to value intangibles; and  updated the guidance on cost contribution 
arrangements. 
Thus, based on the above chapter, does the South African legislation in respect of 
intangibles have adequate rules in place to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among 
group members?  
It is submitted that in parts it does. The strict exchange control restrictions and the anti-
avoidance section, section 23I of the Act, with its punitive tax consequences for the 
payments of royalties by South African taxpayers which previously used to own the 
relevant intellectual property, prevents the easy transfer of intangibles among MNEs 
group members. 
However, perhaps SARS needs to look into adapting the broad and clearly delineated 
definition of intangibles, since there is no definition in the Act or perhaps align the 
definition of intellectual property in section 23I of the Act to the broad definition of 
intangibles per the new chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Section 31 of Act 
5.1 Introduction 
Section 31 was introduced into the Act with effect from 19 July 1995 to counter transfer 
pricing in South Africa. The section has been amended numerous times since then. 
Nyasha Musviba did an analysis of section 31 in an article called ‘Transfer Pricing – 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 section 31 further analysis’ 50. Musviba stated that the old 
section 31 provided the Commissioner with the right to adjust the consideration in 
respect of the transaction to reflect an arm’s length price for the goods or services. As a 
result, taxpayers were not obliged to make the adjustments on their tax returns for 
transactions even if such transactions were not conducted on an arm’s length basis. 
Taxpayers could therefore file tax returns with excessive deductions, and then sit and 
wait and hope for the best – which would be that the Commissioner did not pick up 
these excessive deductions. In the old section, a lot of reliance were placed on the 
Commissioner. Therefore, had the Commissioner not made any adjustments, the 
taxpayer would not make any adjustments in its tax return. 
However, for years of assessment commencing on or after 1 April 2012 the ITA enables 
the Commissioner to adjust the price payable in respect of a supply or acquisition of 
goods or service in terms of an “affected transaction” 51. In terms of section 31(1) of the 
Act an affected transaction means any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding which is undertaken directly or indirectly between: 
 “a person that is a resident and any other person that is not a resident”; 
 “a person that is not a resident and any other person that is not a resident that has a 
permanent establishment in the Republic to which the transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding relates”; 
                                                     
50Nyasha Musviba, Transfer Pricing – Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 section 31 further analysis, South African Tax 
Guide, 11 December 2013, Accessed at http://www.sataxguide.co.za/transfer-pricing-income-tax-act-58-of-1962-
section-31-further-analysis/, Accessed: 18 October 2015. 
51Section 31(1) of the ITA defines an “affected transaction” . 
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 “a person that is a resident and any other person that is a resident that has a 
permanent establishment outside the Republic to which the transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding relates”; or 
 “a person that is not a resident and any other person that is a controlled foreign 
company in relation to any resident, and those persons are connected persons in 
relation to one another”.  
In addition to the above, the terms and pricing of this transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding must also not be at arm’s length, to be an “affected 
transaction”.  
“The two key changes affecting financial assistance arrangements have also been 
incorporated under the new legislation. The first is the inclusion of finance 
arrangements between South African branches of foreign companies and another 
foreign company within the group. The second, perhaps a more radical change, is the 
move from a debt to equity ratio test, for assessing thin capitalisation, to an arm’s length 
test in determining an appropriate funding position.”52 
5.2 Thin Capitalisation 
In line with the OECD's views, SARS has stated that it views the issue of thin 
capitalisation as part of the transfer pricing mandate. Thin capitalisation provisions are 
applied to limit the deductibility of interest where there is a disproportionate ratio 
between the loan capital and equity employed in a company.  
The previous section 31(3), that is the section before 1 April 2012, which allows the 
Commissioner to disallow the deduction of interest by a taxpayer where financial 
assistance has been provided and where the Commissioner regards such financial 
assistance as excessive in relation to the fixed capital of the taxpayer, was deleted when 
the new transfer pricing rules come into force on 1 April 2012.  
                                                     
52Ernst and Young, Transfer pricing global reference guide, February 2013, Accessed: 17 October 2015. 
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The new thin capitalisation rules require that the arm's length principle be applied to 
financial assistance in the same way it is applied to any other transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding. In practice, this will have the result that a taxpayer 
will have to determine what amounts it would have been able to borrow in the open 
market, on what overall terms and conditions, and at what price. (SAICA Article – New 
Rules) 53 
The new rules place more onus on the taxpayer to ensure that its transactions are at 
arm’s length. It also results in confusion to the taxpayer as PN2 that governs the SARS 
interpretation of thin capitalisation and that refers to the 3:1 debt to equity ratio has not 
been withdrawn. With the deletion of the specific thin capitalisation provision, the 3:1 
debt to equity ratio safe harbour provided in PN2 ought to disappear. 
The thin capitalisation rules were further complicated by the introduction of debt 
restriction rules effective for interest incurred on and after 1 January 2015.  Section 
23M of the Act effectively limits the deduction for interest paid between connected 
persons where the interest is not taxed in the hands of the recipient. Briefly stated, the 
interest deduction allowed is calculated as interest received plus an amount calculated 
with reference to a formula, about 40% of EBITDA minus taxable interest incurred in 
respect of other parties. The confusion created with the inclusion of the new section is 
that these new rules and the thin capitalisation rules appear to stand separate. The 
further difficulty arising as a result of the new section is to understand the hierarchy of 
how the sections will correlate.  Even though the limitation of interest deductions in 
terms of section 23M could have the same effect as a thin capitalisation adjustment, the 
interaction between section 23M and the thin capitalisation rules within section 31 is not 
clear. 
                                                     
53New Rules, March 2012 Issue 150, Accessed at https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2012/2044._New_rules.htm, 
Accessed: 17 October 2015. 
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The draft IN states that from an audit risk perspective, SARS will consider a debt 
denominated in rand to be of higher risk if the rate of the inbound loan exceeds the 
weighted average of the South African Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate plus 2%. 
Furthermore, debt denominated in a foreign currency will be considered to be of higher 
risk if the rate applied to the pricing of the inbound exceeds the weighted average of the 
base rate of the country of denomination plus 2%54. However, the draft IN states that 
this is not a safe harbour rule and it does not preclude SARS from auditing a taxpayer 
where the interest rate does not exceed the rates mentioned above. The interest is merely 
indicative of the level of risk set by SARS for the purpose of selecting cases for audit.  
It seems that based on the guidance available, the new capitalisation rules are a 
subjective test. By allowing the thin capitalisation rules to be subjective, SARS 
broadens the test and therefore it does not restrict the test to specific taxpayers. 
The draft IN provides limited guidance regarding the appropriate indicators of arm's 
length debt levels. However, the note does state that a Debt: EBITDA ratio that exceeds 
3:1 will be viewed as resulting in a high thin capitalisation risk55.  
Furthermore, the draft IN states that in addition to the debt to EBITDA ratio, SARS will 
consider a taxpayer to be thinly capitalised if, amongst other factors, some or all of the 
following circumstances exist56:  
 The taxpayer is carrying a greater quantity of interest-bearing debt than it could 
sustain on its own.  
 The duration of the lending is greater than would be the case at arm’s length.  
 The repayment or other terms are not what would have been entered into or agreed 
to at arm’s length.  
                                                     
54SARS, Draft interpretation note: Section 31 Determination of the taxable income of certain persons from 
international transactions: Thin Capitalisation, at 12,  Accessed: 6 September 2015. 
55Ibid. 
56Ibid. 
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5.3 Primary adjustment 
The 2010 OECD transfer pricing guidelines categorize a primary adjustment as “an 
adjustment that a tax administration in a first jurisdiction makes to a company’s taxable 
profits as a result of applying the arm’s length principle to transactions involving an 
associated enterprise in a second tax jurisdiction” 57. 
In the current South African transfer pricing legislation, a primary adjustment results 
where terms and pricing of a transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding is not at arm’s length, and meets the definition of an “affected 
transaction” in terms of section 31 of the Act. The primary adjustment is as a result of a 
tax benefit that arose as a result of non-arm’s length transaction between a South 
African taxpayer and its foreign connected persons. The non-arm’s length portion of the 
transaction will be disallowed in determining the taxpayer’s taxable income. 
5.4 Secondary adjustments 
A secondary adjustment is defined as “an adjustment that arises from imposing tax on a 
secondary transaction.” 58 However, it is submitted that a secondary adjustment is a 
penalty that is levied on a taxpayer for not carrying out its foreign connected 
transactions at an arm’s length price.  
With effect from 1 January 2015 the secondary adjustment in terms of section 31 of the 
Act is as follows: 
• Where the taxpayer is a company, the seondary adjustment is deemed to be a 
dividend of an asset in specie declared by the taxpayer and thus may be subject to 
dividends tax at a rate of 15%, or 
• Where the taxpayer is not a company, the seondary adjustment is deemed to be a 
donation and thus may be subject to donations tax. 
                                                     
57OECD, 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations , at 28. 
58Ernst and Young, Transfer Pricing Global reference guide, 2013, Accessed: 17 October 2015. 
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The date of the deemed dividend or donation is six months after the end of the tax year 
in respect of which the primary adjustment was made.  
Prior to 1 January 2015, the secondary adjustment was in the form of a deemed loan as a 
result of the primary adjustments. The secondary adjustment would be the arm’s length 
interest accruing on the deemed loan that would be taxable.  
However, keeping track of secondary adjustments in the form of a deemed loan proved 
to be a significant administrative burden both for the taxpayer and SARS. In practice, 
there was no legal basis for the foreign company to repay the deemed loan and the 
deemed interest because there were no contractual legal obligations supporting the 
settlement of the loan. It also created difficulties in relation to the accounting treatment 
of the deemed loan and the relevant currency of the deemed loan and deemed interest.59 
The secondary adjustments as a result of the deemed loan were impractical and resulted 
in notional interest ‘accruing’ on a loan that contractually did not exist. The taxpayer 
was responsible to manually preserve its calculations of the loan and interest. 
Furthermore, in the 2014 explanatory memorandum60 to the Bill, SARS states that the 
deemed loan mechanism is problematic because in practice it is simply never repaid. 
The reason for this is that a) there are no contracts setting out the repayment terms 
because it is a deemed loan and not an actual loan; and b) there may be exchange 
control restrictions that prevent the repayment of a deemed loan due to exchange control 
restrictions in the country of the connected person it may be impossible to repatriate the 
funds resulting in an ongoing interest charge for tax purposes. The administrative 
burden of the deemed loan was too significant, therefore the change of the secondary 
adjustment to a deemed dividend in specie with effect from 1 January 2015 was 
welcomed. 
                                                     
59http://www.moneycontrol.com/glossary/taxes/secondary-adjustment_3083.html, Accessed: 26 October 2015. 
60http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/TLAB%20and%20TALAB%202014%20Draft/2014%20Draft%2
0explanatory%20memorundum%20on%20the%20taxation%20laws%20amendment%20bill%20-
%2017%20July%202014.pdf, Accessed: 26 October 2015. 
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Furthermore, where a deemed loan arose before 1 January 2015, any amount still 
outstanding on 1 January 2015 is treated as a dividend or donation, as the case may be, 
on that date. 
The DTC acknowledged that the elimination of the deemed loan mechanism is 
welcomed. However, it is difficult to understand the reasoning behind suggesting that 
the secondary adjustment may, in certain circumstances (presumably where the foreign 
counter-party is a subsidiary rather than a shareholder) be treated as a capital 
contribution.  
The issue that arises as a result of the deemed dividend is whether there is tax treaty 
relief to the 15% withholding tax. The OECD Model Convention with respect to taxes 
on income and capital (Model Convention), Article 10 dealing with dividends states that 
where dividends are “… paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to 
a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. However, 
dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State may also be 
taxed in that State according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the 
dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not 
exceed: 
a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company 
(other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per cent of the capital of the 
company paying the dividends; 
b) 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.” 
In summary, the OECD’s intention is that where a dividend is paid by a South African 
resident company to a resident of the United States (US), the dividend may be taxed in 
the US. However, the dividend may also be taxed in South Africa, and if so, the tax 
charged by South Africa cannot exceed 5 percent where the beneficial owner is a 
company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per cent of the 
capital of the company paying the dividends or 15 percent in all other cases. As 15 
percent is the rate payable in South Africa per the tax legislation, there is no relief. The 
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5 percent rule would provide some kind of relief but it can only be used where the 
beneficial owner is a company which holds at least 25 percent. A beneficial owner is not 
defined in the Model Convention. However, section 64D of the Act defines a beneficial 
owner as a person entitled to the benefit of the dividend attaching to a share. 
The interpretation issue that results here is that even though the secondary adjustment 
results in a deemed dividend in specie, the dividend will not be subject to tax treaty 
relief where the dividend was merely a result of a transaction entered between the South 
African resident and its foreign connected persons where the foreign person does not 
hold the benefit of the dividend as a result of a share (of which it must hold 25 percent 
of the share). 
The DTC alludes to the view that the secondary adjustment is merely a form of penalty 
and therefore no tax treaty relief should be available. The DTC stated that the secondary 
adjustment is seen as more of a penalty than an actual dividend, and therefore to provide 
treaty relief would defeat the intention of the legislation. The DTC stated that this 
transfer of economic value results in depletion in the asset base of the South African 
taxpayer and a resultant potential loss of future taxable income for the Fiscus. 
Therefore, it is suggested that transfer pricing adjustments are economically similar to 
outbound payments of dividends to foreign related parties since they represent a 
distribution of value from a South African to the foreign company61.  
Therefore the secondary adjustment mechanism should result in a tax equivalent to the 
proposed 15% withholding tax. It would be a tax levied on the South African company 
rather than on the foreign related party, and therefore no tax treaty relief would be 
available62. 
                                                     
61Davis Tax Committee, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in South Africa, Davis Tax Committee Interim 
Report, Action 13: Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation, published in 2014, at 19, Accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-13-guidance-implementation-tp-documentation-cbc-reporting.pdf, Accessed: 14 
September 2015. 
62Ibid. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
One of the research objectives is to determine whether there were any changes that have 
been made to the South African tax legislation, since the publishing of the BEPS Action 
Plan in July 2013, in order to bring the South African tax legislation in line with the 
OECD view. 
The significant changes that were made to the Act, were the inclusion of section 23M 
Section 23M of the Act effectively limits the deduction for interest paid between 
connected persons where the interest is not taxed in the hands of the recipient, the 
section however  is only effective from 1 January, 2016 and is applicable in respect of 
amounts of interest incurred on or after that date. The section will reduce the shifting of 
profits to low tax jurisdictions where little or no taxes are paid on interest. 
The issue or confusion created with the inclusion of the new section is that these new 
rules and the thin capitalisation rules appear to stand separate. The further difficulty 
arising as a result of the new section is to understand the hierarchy of how the sections 
will correlate.  Even though the limitation of interest deductions in terms of section 23M 
could have the same effect as a thin capitalisation adjustment, the interaction between 
section 23M and the thin capitalisation rules within section 31 is not clear. 
The secondary adjustment in section 31 of the Act was slightly changed with effect 
from 1 January 2015. This change however does not necessarily align the South African 
tax legislation with the requirements of BEPS or the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. 
In effect, the change to section 31 of the Act allows the secondary adjustment to be that 
of a deemed dividend or a donation, based on certain requirements. This change does 
however present certain interpretation issues, such as whether the secondary adjustment 
resulting in a of a deemed dividend may be subject to tax treaty relief. 
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Chapter 6  Risks of non-compliance 
6.1 Introduction 
If a taxpayer has not maintained appropriate records, the process of checking 
compliance with the arm’s length principle becomes far more difficult and the 
Commissioner’s officials are forced to rely on less documentary evidence in applying a 
transfer pricing method, thus requiring a greater degree of judgment by the 
Commissioner’s officials. 
If a taxpayer elects not to prepare transfer pricing documentation, it leaves itself 
exposed on two counts. Firstly, it is more likely that the Commissioner will examine a 
taxpayer’s transfer pricing in detail if the taxpayer has not prepared proper 
documentation. Secondly, if the Commissioner, as a result of this examination, 
substitutes an alternative arm’s length amount for the one adopted by the taxpayer, the 
lack of adequate documentation will make it difficult for the taxpayer to rebut that 
substitution, either directly to the Commissioner or in the Courts. 
6.2 Risks of non-compliance 
It is submitted that taxpayers in general are trying to fly under SARS’s radar and avoid 
the compilation of transfer pricing documentation.  It is further submitted that some 
transfer pricing risks are as follows: 
 No transfer pricing documentation to demonstrate arm’s length pricing; 
 Incorrect or outdated transfer pricing documentation and policies; 
 Taxpayer does not ensure that arm’s length pricing is correctly implemented; 
 No or insufficient transfer pricing agreements; 
 South African transfer pricing documentation does not tie up with group 
documentation; 
 Profit margins achieved by local company differ from group;  
 Consistent losses incurred as a result of transfer pricing; 
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 Income tax adjustment to reflect arm’s length price, also referred to as a primary 
adjustment; 
 Secondary adjustment (e.g. deemed dividend discussed in chapter 5); 
 Penalties up to 200% of the adjustments where SARS is of the view that it’s a repeat 
case and as a result of tax evasion; 
 Interest; 
 Open to further investigations by tax authorities; and 
 Negative publicity or reputational risk. 
 
Example: 
 
The German holding company charges R25 million service costs to a South African 
company. Assume that the German company overcharges the South African company 
by 10%, and assume all requirements in terms of section 31 of the Act are met.  The 
penalties and additional taxes are illustrated in the table below: 
Description Calculation Tax effect 
Primary transfer pricing 
adjustment 
R2 500 000 x 28% = R700 000 R700 000 
Secondary transfer pricing 
adjustment i.e. Deemed 
dividend 
R2 500 000 x 15% = R375 000 R375 000 
Penalties Between 5% - 200%. On the 
presumption that this is a 
standard case63, it will be 25% 
Primary adjustment: R700 000 x 
25% = R175 000 
Secondary adjustment: R375 000 
x 25% 
R175 000 
R93 750 
Total  R1 343 750 
 
                                                     
63 Assumed that SARS levied an understatement penalty per section 223 of the TAA. SARS deemed the adjustment 
to be a standard case where reasonable care was not taken in completing the taxpayer’s annual income tax return.  
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Therefore as a result of the 10% overcharge on its service costs, the South African MNE 
is subject to additional taxes and penalties of R1 343 750. 
6.3 Conclusion 
The taxes due as a result of non-compliance may not be an issue for a MNE, as they 
may have excess cash to pay transfer pricing adjustments, penalties and interest. 
However, as a result of non-compliance a MNE is subject to reputational risk and public 
perception. The public perception is influenced by what is reported in the media. Even 
though in certain instances the MNE may avoid tax, which in effect is not illegal, the 
public perception may as well deem it to be illegal as the public may have the 
perception that the MNE is not paying its fair share of taxes.  Therefore, the reputation 
impact has a lasting effect and cannot be fixed by merely making a payment to the tax 
authorities. In the 2013 year Google, Starbucks and Amazon were under fire for 
avoiding tax and as a result the public boycotted the brands, indicating that they are 
tired of companies that are not paying their fair share of taxes. 64 
In the article “Google brand damaged by tax row” by Christopher Williams, he states 
that “Google’s reputation in Britain has taken a heavy blow as a result of criticism over 
its avoidance of taxes, a major survey of consumer attitudes suggests. The search engine 
has tumbled over the last year in rankings of brands compiled from a survey of 12,000 
consumers by Clear, M&C Saatchi’s branding agency. Google was named the fifth-
most-desirable brand by Britons in the same survey in 2012, but new figures due to be 
published next week reveal it has fallen out of the top 20.”65 
Where an MNE has damaged its brand, it may take years to correct and re-build 
customer loyalty. In the article “Transfer pricing and Managing your reputational risk”66, it is 
stated that to manage reputational risk, it is critical to seek the assistance of a trusted advisor 
                                                     
64Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The rise of 'tax shaming', 21 May 2013, Article by Vanessa Barford & Gerry Holt, 
BBC Newsmagazine, Accessed at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359, Accessed: 17 October 2015. 
65Google brand damaged by tax row, By Christopher Williams, Technology, Media and Telecoms Editor, 28 June 
2013, Accessed at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/10146737/Google-brand-
damaged-by-tax-row.html, Accessed: 17 October 2015. 
66Transfer pricing and Managing your reputational risk, 21 October 2014, Accessed: 17 October 2015. 
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with the ability to help drive the success of your business in the international market. The 
trusted advisor should have the taxpayer’s reputation and best interests in mind when it comes 
to advising on international tax and transfer pricing matters.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the treatise was to critically analyse the transfer pricing legislation in 
South Africa in light of the recent global discussions regarding BEPS specifically 
aiming at transfer pricing documentation and value creation with reference to 
intangibles. 
7.2 Documentation 
The final Action 13 report and the new Chapter VI of the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines describe a three-tiered standardized approach for transfer pricing 
documentation. This standard consists of: 
 a master file containing standardized information relevant for all group members, 
 local files referring specifically to transactions of the local taxpayer and 
 a country-by-country report containing information on the global allocation of the 
group's income and taxes paid as well as other group data. 
The guidance in PN7 provides a great deal of similarity to that of the local file and 
master file that is required by the OECD, therefore significant changes to the tax 
legislation are not expected in this regard.  
The South African tax legislation does not have any requirements for country-by-
country reporting. South African transfer pricing experts were anticipating significant 
changes in respect of the country-by-country reporting to be brought into tax legislation 
in the 2015 year. The OECD only issued its final report on the 5 October 2015 on 
transfer pricing documentation and updated transfer pricing guidelines. As a result it is 
expected that South African legislation to bring in these OECD guidelines will only be 
amended in the 2016 year.  
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Many tax authorities are asking for transfer pricing documentation to be submitted 
alongside tax returns. Transfer pricing documentation will become part of the annual tax 
compliance cycle, therefore initial planning is imperative and will assist the taxpayer to 
ensure that compliance deadlines are not missed.  
The following countries have announced the implementation of the country-by-country 
reporting67: 
 Unites States; 
 United Kingdom (UK); 
 Australia; 
 Spain; and 
 Poland.  
Canada has proposed rules for country-by-country reporting and has reaffirmed its 
commitment to the BEPS project68. 
Even though there are no specific requirements for transfer pricing documentation in the 
South African tax legislation, taxpayers are urged to start planning for the initial 
preparation of the master file, report and local files to be done simultaneously with the 
country-by-country report in order to ensure consistency of the data provided.  
Furthermore, taxpayers will be required to defend their transfer pricing policies in light 
of the new documentary requirements.  
Due to the fact that the country-by-country report will be shared with all the tax 
jurisdictions in which an MNE has subsidiaries and with which it transacts, the South 
Africa revenue service may be in the possession of crucial and confidential information.  
Therefore, if a company is part of a United Kingdom MNE group and it transacts with 
the UK company, the UK company will be required to complete and submit its country-
                                                     
67Richter, Country-by-Country Reporting: Update on Implementation,  Accessed http://www.richter.ca/en/news-and-
media/publications-and-resources/country-by-country-reporting, Accessed: 27 November 2015. 
68Ibid. 
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by-country report to the UK tax authorities who in turn will pass it on to the South 
African tax authority. 
The intention of sending on the information to the South African tax authority is not so 
that the tax authority may audit the South African company based on the information 
contained in the country-by-country report. It is to provide the South African authority 
with a basis to determine the risk profile of the South African entity. 
In all honesty, will SARS only use it as a risk assessment? How can a taxpayer be 
assured that the tax authorties will not abuse the information provided to them? It is 
submitted that to ensure that they do not abuse the country-by-country report for their 
own benefit, the UK tax authority, in this case, must be strict and indicate that should 
the other tax authorities abuse the country-by-country report, they will no longer supply 
it to them. The UK company may even indicate that they will not comply with the 
regulation should the report be abused by the other authorities. 
7.3 Intangibles 
The new chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing guidelines developed rules to prevent BEPS 
by moving intangibles among group members. In order to achieve this, the new chapter 
adopted a broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles; ensuring that profits 
associated with the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in 
accordance with value creation; developing transfer pricing rules or special measures 
for transfers of hard to value intangibles; and  updated the guidance on cost contribution 
arrangements. 
The guidance focusses on who controls the intangible and who assumes the risks 
associated to the intangible, not necessarily the legal owner of the intangible. However a 
company may contractually own the asset but may not be able to exercise the control 
over that risk nor has the financial capacity to assume the risk. In that case the guidance 
in the revised chapter determines that the risk will be allocated to another member of the 
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MNE group that does exercise such control and has the financial capacity to assume the 
risk. The control requirement is used in this chapter to determine which parties assume 
risks in relation to intangibles, but also for assessing which member of the MNE group 
in fact controls the performance of outsourced functions in relation to the development, 
enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. 
Section 23I of the Act, the anti-avoidance section, in broad terms seeks to disallow as a 
deduction any expenditure incurred for the use of certain intellectual property, where 
the intellectual property was previously owned by a South African entity and transferred 
to a non-South African entity or was developed in South Africa. 
The punitive tax consequences in section 23I of the Act does provide a very good 
platform to prevent instances of BEPS using intangibles. However, perhaps SARS 
needs to look into adapting the broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles, 
since there is no definition in the Act, or perhaps align the definition of intellectual 
property in section 23I of the Act to the broad definition of intangibles per the new 
chapter. This will ensure that the company actually controlling the intangible, not only 
contractually but financially, will assume the risk that is associated to the intangible. 
7.4 Overall 
Chapter 1 introduced the treatise and set out the objective and aims thereof.  In chapter 
2  transfer pricing was explained with specific reference to the arm’s length principle 
and the transfer pricing methods that are acceptable to  SARS  was discussed and it was 
shown that South Africa only partly complies with the OECD model guidelines as the 
South African tax legislation does not specifically provide guidance to the arm’s length 
principal and the transfer pricing methods, however, PN7 (bear in mind this in not 
legislation) provides guidance to the acceptability of certain transfer pricing methods by 
SARS. It also provides guidance to the arm’s length principal. 
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Chapter 3 discussed the OECD guidelines on transfer pricing documentation, it further 
gave an overview of the DTC commentary regarding Action 13.  Once again, the South 
African tax legislation provides no guidance as to the requirements of transfer pricing 
documentation. However, the guidance in PN7 provides a lot of similarity to that of the 
local file and master file that is required by the OECD. However the South African 
legislation does not have any requirements for country-by-country reporting. South 
Africa has not made any changes to its tax legislation in light of the OECD report of 
transfer pricing documentation. 
Chapter 4 discusses value creation in respect of intangibles, risks and capital, and risk 
transactions and therefore gives an overview of the DTC commentary regarding Action 
8 and to determine whether the current tax legislation is in terms of the updated OECD 
guideline. It was discussed that in part the South African tax legislation is in line with 
the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines in the sense that it response to BEPS. The strict 
exchange control restrictions and the anti-avoidance section, section 23I of the Act, with 
its punitive tax consequences for the payments of royalties by South African taxpayers 
which previously used to own the relevant intellectual property, prevents the easy 
transfer of intangibles among MNEs group members. However, the possible change that 
can be made to the legislation to ensure that it is fully in line with the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and the BEPS Action Plan, perhaps is that SARS needs to look into 
adapting the broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles, seeing that there is 
no definition in the Act or perhaps align the definition of intellectual property in section 
23I of the Act to the broad definition of intangibles per the new chapter. 
Chapter 5 gave overview of section 31 of the Act on and after 1 January 2015. The 
significant changes that were made to the Act, were the inclusion of section 23M of the 
Act. Section 23M of the Act Act effectively limits the deduction for interest paid 
between connected persons where the interest is not taxed in the hands of the recipient, 
the section however  is only effective from 1 January, 2016 and is applicable in respect 
of amounts of interest incurred on or after that date. The section will reduce the shifting 
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of profits to low tax jurisdictions where little or no taxes are paid on interest. The issue 
or confusion created with the inclusion of the new section is that these new rules and the 
thin capitalisation rules appear to stand separate. The further difficulty arising as a result 
of the new section is to understand the hierarchy of how the sections will 
correlate.  Even though the limitation of interest deductions in terms of section 23M 
could have the same effect as a thin capitalisation adjustment, the interaction between 
section 23M and the thin capitalisation rules within section 31 is not clear. 
Chapter 6 discussed the risks of non-compliance, both financially and the impact to an 
MNE’s reputation. 
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